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PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND
JURISDICTION
The

Complaint

of Plaintiff, in the Court

below, sought

recovery of the sum of Twenty Thousand Eight Hundred Fifteen
Dollars

and

64/100

($20,815,64)

representing

auto

parts and

supplies sold by the Plaintiff to the Defendant business known as
RTEM, Inc.

Specifically, Plaintiff sought to recover from the

Defendant Shillington by reason of a written personal guaranty
given by the Defendant in connection with the sale of the goods
to RTEM.
After the answer of the Defendant Shillington, a Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed by the Plaintiff,
Motion was accompanied

(R. 82.)

That

by an Affidavit of Vern K. Yoho, the

President and Chief Executive Officer of the Plaintiff (R. 79),
as well as Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

(R. 85.)

After oral argument, the Trial Court entered judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Shillington.
The Court ruled that there were no genuine issues as to material
facts regarding the fact of Shillington1 s execution of an unambiguous personal guaranty.
It is from that judgment that the Defendant
filed this Appeal.

Shillington

The matter was originally appealed to the

Utah Supreme Court and was then transferred to this Court pursuant to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
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SUMMARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
As this Court is aware, the decision of the Trial Court with
respect to factual matters is not to be disturbed unless there
can be shown that there was no basis in the record

for the

findings made and that the decision of the Trial Court was an
abuse of discretion.

In this

undisputed

not

and

have

been

case

the

disputed

following
by

the

facts are
Defendant

Shillington:
1.

The Plaintiff at all times pertinent to this action was

a corporation in the business of supplying auto parts and supplies to retail jobbers.
2.

(R. 86.)

The Defendant Shillington operated a franchising busi-

ness known as "Mr. Parts".

Under the Defendant Shillington1s

program, a retail auto parts franchise would be set up under the
name "Mr. Parts" with the assistance of Shillington.
3.

(R. 86.)

The Defendant Shillington was a primary customer of the

Plaintiff and used the Plaintiff as the major source of supply
for

the

initial

inventory

to

a

new

franchise

operation.

(Shillington Depo. Pg. 10.)
4.
the

The Defendant RTEM was a new franchise established under

supervision

of Shillington, and was

retailing auto parts.
5.

for

the purpose

of

(R. 86.)

When the Plaintiff was asked

to supply the initial

inventory for RTEM, the request was denied because of the lack of
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financial stability of Mr. Eldon Mecham, one of the principals of
RTEM.

(Yoho Depo. Pg. 10.)
6.

Only after Shillington agreed to be personally responsi-

ble for the goods sent to RTEM did the Plaintiff approve the
extension of credit.
7.

(Yoho Depo. Pg. 12.)

The Defendants RTEM and Shillington executed an applica-

tion for credit with the Plaintiff.
8.

(Shillington Depo. Pg. 21.)

Based upon the strength of that application for credit,

and upon Shillington1s promise to pay, Plaintiff provided goods
and services to the Defendant RTEM, including the initial inventory merchandise on open account.

The balance due on that open

account was, at the time judgment was sought, Twenty Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifteen Dollars and 64/100 ($20,815.64).
9.

(R. 86.)

The Defendant Shillington signed the credit application

as a guarantor of the sums due for the merchandise delivered to
the Defendant RTEM.
10.

(Shillington Depo. Pg. 21.)

The Defendant Shillington admits that he understood he

was guarantying the obligations of RTEM.

(Shillington Depo. Pgs.

31-35.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The position of the Plaintiff is that the entry of Summary
Judgment by the Trial Court was well supported by the undisputed
facts and that this Court should not disturb that ruling.
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T.n

specific

response

to

the

issues

raised

by

the

Defendant

Shillington, Plaintiff argues as follows:
1.

Whenever there is ample evidence to support the ruling

of the lower court, this Court must not impose a different
decision.

In the case at hand there is more than enough evidence

to support the ruling of the Trial Court,

The simple fact is

that the Defendant agreed to sign a personal guaranty of the RTEM
obligations in order to induce Plaintiff to deliver the inventory.

The

Trial

Court

did

nothing

more

than

enforce

that

obligation.
2.

The Defendant's reliance upon §70A-3-606 of the Utah

Code Annotated is not only factually inapplicable but legally
inappropriate.
tiff

has

The Defendant attempts to argue that the Plain-

somehow

impaired

the

collateral.

However,

§70A-3-606(1)(b) deals exclusively with the holder of a negotiable instrument.

See, §70A-3-102.

There is no negotiable instru-

ment in the case at hand; §70A-3-606 is therefore inapplicable.
3.

The remainder of the arguments of the Defendant center

around the contention that the agreement signed by the Defendant
is somehow ambiguous.

However, any such ambiguity is the product

of the arguments of counsel and is not based
document is, in itself, clear.
do not create an ambiguity.

in fact.

The

The spaces which were left blank

Most importantly, the Defendant has

never, by any sworn statement, stated that he did not understand
that he was signing a personal guaranty of RTEM's obligation.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
This Court is well aware that the standard for review of the
lower Court's decision is that such ruling cannot be disturbed
where there is ample evidence to support the same.

This Court

cannot gainsay the decision of the Trial Judge unless it is
clearly shown that there has been an abuse of discretion.
The Plaintiff has set out the specific

facts which are

undisputed in the record upon which which the Trial Court made
its decision.
those facts.

The Defendant has not raised any dispute as to
The Defendant has attempted, merely, to create a

smoke screen so as to obscure the undisputed nature of these
facts.

The statement of Defendant's counsel that the facts are

disputed does not create such a dispute.
The undisputed facts are that the Defendant granted a Mr.
Parts

franchise

to RTEM

inventory from Plaintiff.

and

wanted

to purchase

the

initial

Plaintiff would not allow the invento-

ry to go out until the Defendant, himself, had agreed to personally guaranty the obligation of RTEM.

Only after that promise

was received did the merchandise leave the control of Plaintiff.
The Defendant understood what he was signing and knew that he was
obligating himself to the Plaintiff.
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POINT II
THE RELIANCE OF DEFENDANT ON
§70A-3-606 IS INAPPROPRIATE
A good portion of the Brief of the Defendant is taken up
with

a

discussion

of

(1953), as amended.

§70A-3-606(1)(b), Utah

Code

Annotated

The Defendant attempts to argue from this

section of the statute that the Plaintiff lost its right to
recover against the Defendant on the basis that there was an
"impairment" of the security.

The Defendant's argument is that

something which the Plaintiff did with respect to the goods sold
to RTEM prevents the Plaintiff from recovering the balance due
against this Defendant.

This argument must fail for the follow-

ing reasons:
1.

Nowhere

in the Brief of the Defendant, nor in any

pleadings filed with the Trial Court, did the Defendant raise an
issue as to the disposition of collateral.

In other words, there

is no factual basis for the Trial Court, or this Court, to
believe that there was any "impairment" of the collateral.

If

the Defendant honestly believed that such was the case, he should
have set forth, by some competent evidence, his belief.
2.

Even if there were some credible evidence upon which the

Trial Court could have made a ruling that there was a possibility
of impairment, it is clear from the statute itself that the same
does not apply to the facts of this case.
specifically provides:

-7-

The section cited

The holder discharges any party to the instrument
to the extent that without such parties consent the
holder . . . .
The term "instrument" in the statute is defined at §70A-3-102 as
follows:
"Instrument"
instrument.
One need

only

means

a

negotiable

look at §70A-3-104 to know that the personal

guaranty of the Defendant does not qualify as .a

"negotiable

instrument".
The Defendant relies upon a statute which is clearly inapplicable to the case at hand.

The issue of impairment of

security under the Uniform Commercial Code simply has no relevance to the issues before this Court.
POINT III
THE PERSONAL GUARANTY SIGNED BY
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
A majority of the remaining arguments raised by the Defendant/ those involving the intent of Mr. Shillington, and the
blank spaces left in the document, have, as their central theme,
the alleged ambiguity of the agreement itself.

In other words,

in order for this Court to adopt any one of these arguments, this
Court must first find that the Trial Court erred in ruling that
the agreement was, itself, unambiguous.
This Court is well aware of the controlling rule of law when
dealing with contractual interpretation.

The Supreme Court of

Utah has, on numerous occasions, held that the meaning of a

-8-

contract is to be determined, where possible, from the language
used in the document itself.

Where that language is unambiguous,

it is the duty of the Court to enforce the agreement.

See,

Buehner Block, Co. vs. U. W. C. Associates, 792 P.2d 892 (Utah
1988); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch, Co. vs. Salt Lake City, 740
P.2d 1357 (Ut.App. 1987).
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the intent
of the parties is to be shown from the language of the contract
whenever possible.

See, Utah Valley Bank vs. Tanner, 636 P. 2d

1060 (Utah 1981); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. vs. Holm, 570 P.2d 690
(Utah 1977).
The document which is the subject matter of this action,
when read in total, specifically sets out to whom the credit is
to be extended (RTEM) and then contains the following language:
The undersigned, in consideration of the delivery
of merchandise by [Yoho Automotive] to the above applicant, agrees personally to assume any liability incurred by the above company and guarantees that payment
will be made strictly according to the terms set forth
herein.
Directly below this language, the Defendant affixed his signature.

(R. 10.)

The Defendant

simply could

not have misun-

derstood or been mislead as to the clarity of the language and
what its effect would be.
The cases cited by the Defendant, without exception, deal
with contracts, both oral and written, which were uncertain.

The

case of West v. West, 15 Utah 2d 87, 387 P.2d 686 (1963), quoted

-9-

by the Defendant at page 11 of his Brief specifically makes the
finding that the documents, in that case, were "ambiguous and
uncertain".

No similar uncertainty exists in the document which

is the subject matter of this case.
Similarly, in the Alaska case of DeCristofaro vs. Security
National Bank, 664 P.2d 167 (AK. 1983), cited by the Defendant at
page 10 of his Brief, the Court specifically held that there was
an ambiguity as to a non-competition clause in a contract.

The

Court therefore ruled that summary judgment was not appropriate.
Again, no similar ambiguity exists in the present case.
What the Defendant really wants this Court to believe is
that because certain blanks in the form which he signed were left
unfilled, the contract is, therefore, unenforceable.

In other

words, the Defendant equates blanks in the contract with ambiguity.
However, at no time does the Defendant allege, by way of
sworn statement, that he did not understand what he was signing
or that he did not intend to guaranty the obligation of RTEM.
Rather, the Defendant spends much time indicating that he did not
like the idea of signing the guaranty.

The fact that he did not

like the idea and, therefore, signed "under protest" does not
exculpate the Defendant from his liability.

Indeed, the very

fact that he was protesting his signature indicates that he
understood what the intent was.
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POINT IV
THE PERSONAL GUARANTY IS
SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION
In the Court below, the Plaintiff testified
President, Mr. Vern K. Yoho.

As has been

through its

indicated

in the

Summary Statement of Facts, Mr. Yoho testified that he allowed
goods to be sent to RTEM only after receiving the promise of Mr.
Shillington to be personally responsible for the debt of RTEM.
Mr. Yoho further testified that without that promise he would
never have allowed credit to be extended to RTEM.

(Yoho Depa.

Pg. 12.)
The rule of law is that where there is reliance upon a
promise to guaranty the debt of another, even if the actual
guaranty is signed later, there is consideration for the guaranty.

This is the specific holding of Ranier National Bank vs.

Lewis, 30 Wash. App. 419, 635 P.2d 153 (1981).
Indeed, in Northern State Construction, Co. vs. Robbins, 457
P.2d 187 (Wash. 1969), cited by the Defendant on pages 23 and 24
of his Brief, the Court dealt specifically with that fact situation.

In Northern, the Plaintiff, in reliance upon a promise of

another to guaranty the debt, allowed credit to be extended.
When the guarantor attempted to get out of his liability, the
Court held that his promise to pay, upon which reliance was made,
was supported by consideration.
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Again, the cases cited by the Defendant are simply factually
irrelevant.

In the Moorcraft decision cited by the Defendant on

page 26 of his Brief, there was no involvement of the guarantor
in the debt created by the third party.

In other words, there

was no reliance by the Plaintiff on the promise of the guarantor
to pay.
In the case at hand the credit was extended solely upon the
basis of the promise of the Defendant to be personally responsible.

That fact is undisputed and uncontested by the Defendant.

The consideration for the agreement to pay was the actual extension of credit.

Therefore, the Defendant cannot now claim that

his promise to pay was unsupported by consideration.
POINT V
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT COERCED
One of the more unique arguments made by Defendant is that
he was somehow the object of "business Compulsion" in the signing
of the personal guaranty.

One can only suppose that this argu-

ment is the natural outgrowth of Defendant's belief that he
signed the document "under protest".

However, the facts of this

case do not come even close to a case of wrongful compulsion or
coercion.

The Courts have long held that business compulsion is

not established merely by proof that the consent of the party was
obtained by the pressure of financial circumstances, or by the
fact that one party insisted upon a legal right and the other
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yielded.

The pressure must be wrongful.

89 P.2d 513 (Wash. 1929).

See, Starks v. Field,

Furthermore, action taken by one as a

result of a deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot
ordinarily be attributed to duress.

See,

Imperial Refineries

Corp vs. Morrissey, 119 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1964).
In light of the caselaw, the circumstances surrounding the
Defendant's

execution

of the agreement, which he knew would

obligate him as a personal guarantor of RTEM's debts, does not
rise to the level of "business compulsion".

The Defendant was

reluctant and didn't want to create a hassle.

(Shillington Depo.

pg. 35.)

He had alternatives available, however, and no wrongful

pressure was brought to bear upon him.

Clearly, his choice was

freely made and he is bound by it.
POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL TO EQUITY
IS INAPPROPRIATE
Finally, the Defendant appeals to what can only be described
as the "conscience" of this Court.

The Defendant argues that "as

a matter of equity" it is "unfair and unconscionable" to hold Mr.
Shillington liable on such a document, to enforce a guaranty for
any liability without definition and limitation and to allow the
Plaintiff to capitalize "on their own errors and negligence".
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Land vs. Land, 605
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) declared:
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Equity is not available to reinstate rights and
privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because
one has come to regret the bargain made. ^1(3. at 1251.
Likewise, in Mackey vs. Philzona Petroleum, Co., 93 Ariz.
87, 378 P.2d 906 (1963), the Arizona Supreme Court held that with
regard

to business

dealing at arms1

transactions

between men

of

sound minds,

length, equity will not give relief against

merely thoughtless or inadvertent conduct.

See also, Diamond

Fruit Growers, Inc. vs. Goe, Co., 242 Oregon 397, 409 P.2d 909
(1966).
The Defendant's sense of morality and justice seems misguided.

What is fair is to enforce the agreements of competent

adults.

What is unfair is to allow a party to avoid his just

debts.
CONCLUSION
There is, without doubt, no basis for the appeal taken by
the Defendant.

The Defendant clearly knew what he was doing and

understood the effect of his signature on the personal guaranty.
The language of the guaranty is clear and understandable to men
of ordinary intelligence.

The Plaintiff clearly relied upon the

Defendant's promise to pay.
///
///
///
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It is respectfully suggested that the decision of the Trial
Court was entirely appropriate and should be affirmed by this
Court.

Moreover, the Plaintiff should be entitled to its costs

incurred in Defending this appeal, as well as the attorney's fees
incurred

as

are

agreed

to by

the

Defendant

in the written

guaranty.
Dated this 14th day of October, 1988.
POOLE &) SMITH

ffi R. SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent

YOHOSHILLBRF/
PLEAD9
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct

copy

of the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF THE RESPONDENT

YOHO

AUTOMOTIVE, INC. to the following:
Jerry J. Kaufman, Esq,
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
THORPE, NORTH & WESTERN
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah
8 4070
and by depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage
prepaid thereon, in the United States Mails at Salt Lake City,
Utah this 14th day of Octobe/, 1988.
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